Ideas from 'Objects and Persons' by Trenton Merricks [2003], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Objects and Persons' by Merricks,Trenton [OUP 2003,0-19-926631-x]].

green numbers give full details    |     back to texts     |     expand these ideas

---

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

6123	Empirical investigation can't discover if holes exist, or if two things share a colour

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events

6143	Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality

6135	A crumbling statue can't become vague, because vagueness is incoherent

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties

6145	Intrinsic properties are those an object still has even if only that object exists

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects

6124	I say that most of the objects of folk ontology do not exist

6134	Is swimming pool water an object, composed of its mass or parts?

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples

6125	We can eliminate objects without a commitment to simples

9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects

14229

Merricks agrees that there are no composite objects, but offers a different semantics [Liggins]

6142	The 'folk' way of carving up the world is not intrinsically better than quite arbitrary ways

14472

If atoms 'arranged baseballwise' break a window, that analytically entails that a baseball did it [Thomasson]

14469

Overdetermination: the atoms do all the causing, so the baseball causes no breakage

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

6137	Clay does not 'constitute' a statue, as they have different persistence conditions (flaking, squashing)

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object

6141	There is no visible difference between statues, and atoms arranged statuewise

6127	'Unrestricted composition' says any two things can make up a third thing

6131	Composition as identity is false, as identity is never between a single thing and many things

6132	Composition as identity is false, as it implies that things never change their parts

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

6130	'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object

6138	It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects

6128	Objects decompose (it seems) into non-overlapping parts that fill its whole region

9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 13. No Identity over Time

6136	Eliminativism about objects gives the best understanding of the Sorites paradox

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts

6133	If my counterpart is happy, that is irrelevant to whether I 'could' have been happy

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues

6150	The 'warrant' for a belief is what turns a true belief into knowledge

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body

6144	You hold a child in your arms, so it is not mental substance, or mental state, or software

16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'

6140	Maybe the word 'I' can only refer to persons

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism

6149	Free will and determinism are incompatible, since determinism destroys human choice

17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism

6148	Human organisms can exercise downward causation

18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content

6147	The hypothesis of solipsism doesn't seem to be made incoherent by the nature of mental properties

6146	Before Creation it is assumed that God still had many many mental properties